Did India Really Lose the Peace After Winning the 1971 War? New Book By C. Dasgupta Shatters Myths

Описание к видео Did India Really Lose the Peace After Winning the 1971 War? New Book By C. Dasgupta Shatters Myths

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In a 30-interview to Karan Thapar for The Wire, Chandrashekhar Dasgupta, a former Ambassador to China and the European Union, and the author of ‘India and the Bangladesh Liberation War: The Definitive Story’ says: “: “The records conclusively disprove the story popularised by Field Marshal Manekshaw that he had dissuaded Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in April from sending an unprepared Indian army into East Pakistan.”

Mr. Dasgupta points out that although under pressure from some members of her Cabinet to intervene in April 1971, Indira Gandhi had made up her mind to wait for several months. Her Principal Advisor, P. N. Haksar said: “We cannot, at the present stage, contemplate armed intervention at all …. it would evoke hostile reactions from all over the world and all the sympathy and support which the Bangladesh (cause) has been able to evoke in the world will be drowned in (an) Indo-Pak conflict.”

It was against this background that Mrs. Gandhi asked for Manekshaw’s opinion. This is what Mr. Dasgupta writes: “The Prime Minister asked for the Army Chief Gen. Sam Manekshaw’s opinion, knowing fully well that he would need time to prepare for a major unplanned contingency. Failing to see through the Prime Minister’s political ploy, Manekshaw, a gifted raconteur, circulated a colourful tale about how he had restrained Mrs. Gandhi from ordering the Indian army to march into East Pakistan in April.”

A second myth shattered in Mr. Dasgupta’s book is about who was “the principal architect” of the invasion plan of 1971. Most people have assumed it was Manekshaw. Mr. Dasgupta’s book shows that it was, in fact, the Chief of Staff of Eastern Command, Maj. Gen. JFR Jacob, as he then was.

The original plan was based on the belief that the war would be ended before an unconditional Pakistani surrender could happen by a UN enforced ceasefire and, therefore, “the aim … was to occupy the major part of Bangladeshi territory and to place the Pakistani forces in an untenable position that would soon compel them to withdraw from the rest of the territory.” It was Jacob who insisted that Dacca “was the geopolitical heart of East Pakistan and its capture should be the key objective of army operations.”

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