Скачать или смотреть Why Rommel Warned His Generals About Patton After Three Weeks — And Left Africa

Mid-February 1943. Tunisia.
In the aftermath of Kasserine Pass, Field Marshal Erwin Rommel believed he had just witnessed the collapse of a new enemy. American units retreated without coordination. Armor and infantry fought separately. Radio discipline broke down under pressure. In six days, U.S. II Corps suffered more than six thousand casualties.

Rommel documented everything.

In letters and operational assessments sent to Berlin, he concluded that the American army lacked experienced leadership and effective doctrine. Based on everything Germany had learned since 1939, such weaknesses usually took months—sometimes years—to correct. If German forces struck again quickly, before the Americans adapted, Rommel believed they could force a decisive defeat.

But three weeks later, his judgment began to change.

In early March 1943, Rommel learned that Lieutenant General George S. Patton Jr. had assumed command of the same American corps that collapsed at Kasserine. German intelligence initially dismissed the development. One general could not rebuild a defeated formation in such a short time. Morale might improve, but doctrine would not.

Then reports from the front began to shift.

American units were reorganizing faster than expected. Discipline tightened. Artillery coordination improved. Defensive positions were reinforced with overlapping fields of fire. Patrol activity increased. Rommel warned his remaining commanders that future operations should not assume American forces would break as they had before.

The warning was brief, cautious—and largely ignored.

On March 9th, 1943, Rommel left North Africa on sick leave. Years of constant campaigning had taken a physical toll. He would never return to the African theater. Operational command passed to Generaloberst Hans-Jürgen von Arnim, who inherited Rommel’s plans—but not his growing caution about American adaptability.

On March 23rd, German forces attacked U.S. positions at El Guettar expecting another Kasserine. Instead, they encountered coordinated American artillery, disciplined withdrawals, aggressive counterattacks, and carefully positioned anti-tank defenses. The offensive stalled. Within days, it was abandoned.

What Rommel had begun to understand in three weeks became clear to everyone else too late.

The Americans had not received new equipment. They had not trained for months. They had changed leadership, doctrine, and mindset with remarkable speed. Patton removed hesitant officers, promoted aggressive commanders, and enforced a simple principle: counterattack immediately and concentrate firepower decisively.

German generals later acknowledged the transformation. American forces learned faster than any opponent Germany faced. By May 1943, more than 250,000 Axis troops in Tunisia surrendered. The North African campaign was over.

Rommel did not lose Africa because he misjudged American equipment.
He lost it because he underestimated how quickly the Americans could learn.

📊 This documentary reveals:

✓ WW2 campaign analysis of Kasserine Pass and El Guettar
✓ German intelligence assessments of the U.S. Army in 1943
✓ Erwin Rommel’s judgment and evolving caution
✓ George S. Patton’s leadership doctrine and rapid reform
✓ World War II lessons on adaptation and command

History does not always change slowly. Sometimes it turns in weeks.

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📚 Sources:
– German After-Action Reports, North Africa, 1943
– Rommel correspondence, February–March 1943
– U.S. Army Historical Division Records
– Postwar interrogations of German generals