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"Disagreement and (almost) sameness of concepts"
Ismael Martínez Torres [Investigador posdoctoral IIFs]

Replicante: Dr. Pau Luque
Moderador: Dr. Esteban Withrington

Resumen:
Ronald Dworkin has advanced a disagreement-based argument against legal positivism. This argument relies on the presupposition that for disagreement to take place, the disagreeing individuals must share the same concepts. In this paper I debunk Dworkin’s argument by proving such a presupposition mistaken. Drawing on some new findings from cognitive science and social psychology, I argue that disagreement does not require sameness of concepts. If there can be disagreement despite conceptual variance, then Dworkin’s argument fails to prove legal positivism unable to account for (the relevant type of) legal disagreements and thus to give good reason against such a theory.