Tom Froese: Integrating phenomenology and systems theory. Case Study on Schizophrenia.

According to the phenomenological tradition the minimal self is constituted in the recursive dynamics of the self-temporalizing of time consciousness. Contemporary phenomenological accounts of schizophrenia have employed this traditional analysis and characterized it as essentially a disorder of the minimal self. In this talk I will make use of the dynamical systems approach to cognitive science to highlight a distinction that has largely remained implicit in these accounts, namely between structural and affective self-constitution. I will argue that the disorder can be more fruitfully approached as a disorder of the latter rather than of the former. Many symptoms do not seem structurally pathological from the perspective of systems theory. Instead they seem to be caused by an unstable sense of self-familiarity: falling into hypo-familiarity produces an exaggeration of the felt distance between the ego and the stream of consciousness, leading to disowned experiences, while falling into hyper-familiarity eradicates this felt distance, leading to complete self-absorption during which the patient is reduced to automatisms without any accompanying reflection. Moreover, these pathological extremes of familiarity not only apply to tshe patient’s relationship with their self, but also to their relationship with the world and with other people. Based on these considerations I propose a new classification scheme that helps us to make sense of the most characteristic symptoms.