Скачать или смотреть A Critique of Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness

Here is a link to my essay (and my replies to possible objections): https://thepessimisticidealist.blogsp...

Illusionism is the view that sensory-qualities do not, in fact, exist as features of anything in the world. Nothing—whether it be an object or an experience—has sensory-qualities. If an object (or experience) seems to have sensory-qualities, it is because our brain’s introspective mechanisms have misrepresented the object (or experience) as having them. Illusionism cannot get off the ground unless it can establish the truth or plausibility of the following proposition:

(A) There exist “representations of sensory-qualities” (e.g., a “representation of the sensory-quality of redness”) that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind. This is a very strong claim, and Frankish must adequately defend it without recourse to faith, intuition, or revelation.

The Illusionist's line of reasoning can be summarized as follows:

P1) If there have been instances where we have observed “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, then “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” can exist without needing to have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent.

P2) If “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” can exist without needing to have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, then it is possible for there to exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind.

C1) Therefore, if there have been instances where we have observed “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, then it is possible for there to exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind. [From P1—P2]

P3) There have been instances where we have observed “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent.

C2) Therefore, it is possible for there to exist “representations of particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities” that not only do not have the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities they represent, but are also themselves totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind. [From P1—C1, P3]

Such reasoning is clearly fallacious. It is a complete non sequitur—as well as an example of hasty generalization. If Illusionism is to be held to its own standards, it cannot be allowed to defend its foundation-stone by appealing to ‘intuitions’. Illusionism must appeal to the ‘empirical’.

Now, we have had many instances of observation wherein we have observed a “representation of a particular sensory-quality” (e.g., a representation of the sensory-quality of redness) as not having the particular determinate (or determinable) sensory-quality it represents. Furthermore, we have never had any instances of observation wherein a “representation of a particular sensory-quality” (e.g., a representation of the sensory-quality of redness) is observed as being totally devoid of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of any determinable kind. Again, we have always observed objects (“representations” included) as having or consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds. Lastly, we have never had any instances of observation wherein the observed objects (“representations” included) are observed as neither having nor consisting of determinate (or determinable) sensory-qualities of one or more determinable kinds.

From these facts, it is clear that the Illusionist is not justified in believing (A) from instances of empirical observation. Unless we are justified in believing (A), then we cannot be justified that Illusionism is true. Since we are not justified in believing (A), it follows that we are not justified in believing Illusionism to be true.