Скачать или смотреть How Secret Weapons Programs Cause War | Nuclear Proliferation Explained

Before, we had assumed that an opponent could perfectly observe a potential proliferator's decision to construct nuclear weapons. This lecture relaxes that assumption, motivated by how modern nuclear technology can leave a small footprint and also has peaceful uses. Deals still work under these circumstances, provided that the cost of concessions is cheaper than the cost of preventive war.

When preventive war is the cheaper option, things get complicated. If either party acts predictably, the opposing party can exploit it. That means that potential proliferators should sometimes build nuclear weapons and sometimes not, while opponent should sometimes engage in preventive war and sometimes should not.

This yields a number of implications. For the first time so far, preventive wars occur with positive probability. So too do successful power shifts, generating another explanation for nuclear proliferation. Perhaps most interestingly, opponents sometimes fight preventive wars despite no weapons programs existing. This means that situations like the Iraq War can occur through rational means despite how ridiculous the outcome looks.