Скачать или смотреть Preston Stovall, "Shared Intentionality and Discursive Cognition"

In other work, I provide a semantics interpreting descriptive claims in terms of mental states where the mind is meant to fit with the world, whereas claims made under intentional and deontic modal operators are interpreted in terms of mental states where the world is meant to fit with the mind. Wilfrid Sellars defended a perspective of this sort, taking it to be rooted in Kantian and Peircean ideas about the relationship between theoretical and practical rationality. Developing some of Allan Gibbard’s views in this vicinity, I interpret deontic and intentional modal claims in terms of maximally decided plans of action. I then show how to understand claims falling under the individual and shared intentional modal operators (I shall and we shall) in terms of similar sorts of plans. Crucially, a notion of single-mindedness is needed to account for the difference between the strong and weak deontic modal planning state. The intentional modalities lack a strong and weak modal force, however, and so they can be modelled by plans that do not discriminate single-minded agency. This notion of single-mindedness sheds light on the (Kantian and Peircean) sense in which the conclusion drawn in a practical inference counts as both an exercise of intentional cognition concerning what one shall do, and an exercise of rational cognition concerning what one ought to do in a given situation.


Ethics, Practical Reasoning, Agency: Sellars' Practical Philosophy,
Grand Valley State University & Georgetown University in Qatar.
Online Philosophy Conference (2021).

https://www.gvsu.edu/sellars-conference/