Скачать или смотреть Philosophers and Neuroscientists in Conversation - Full Interview

Chapters:

0:00 Title
0:09 What are the advantages and challenges in collaborations between neuroscientists and philosophers when studying free will?
18:11 Following this collaboration, how can an abstract notion like free will be probed experimentally?
32:08 If volition / free action must be reasons-responsive (i.e. NOT the Libet task) then how should we think about Libet-type actions? Are they just a degenerate case of decision-making where value is nil or is there something distinct about them?
36:40 "What are the expected neural/physical differences between:
1) a ""free-will zombie"" who does not have free will (could not have chosen option B in a 2AFC decision task, but thinks they could have) but retains the psychological feeling of having free will, and
2) a being who does have free will but not the psychological feeling of having free will (could have chosen option A or B in a 2AFC but does not realise it)?"
41:49 What do you think is the strongest argument or evidence for and against free will?
48:21 How would you characterize the relationship (if any) between consciousness and free will?
55:38 Do you think it is possible to provide a simple and unambiguous "mathematical" definition of the terms: awareness, consciousness, and attention?
1:02:42 Some decisions are considered to be biased to a certain degree or under certain conditions, without this endangering free will as a whole. Where would you draw the line after which the decision is unfree, or without moral responsibility?

Video credit:
Gretchen Albers
Sophie Kelly