Metaethics - Quasi-Realism

Quasi-realists hold that moral judgments are expressions of noncognitive states such as attitudes and plans for action. At first sight, this is a thoroughly antirealist position: if moral judgments are not standard beliefs, then there is no room for moral truth, moral facts, or moral progress. But the quasi-realist attempts to show that we can vindicate these apparently realist notions, even from a noncognitivist, antirealist starting point. This video outlines the approach to quasi-realism developed by Simon Blackburn.

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Blackburn 1993, "Essays in Quasi-Realism"
Blackburn 1999, "Is objective moral justification possible on a quasi-realist foundation?"
Cuneo 2017, "Quasi-realism" (in The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics)
Dreier 2004, "Meta-ethics and the problem of creeping minimalism"
Gibbard 2003, "Thinking How to Live"
Miller 2003, "An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics", chapter 4

0:00 - Introduction
4:19 - The realist surface
9:01 - Quasi-realism
19:57 - Moral truth
32:07 - Fallibility, error, and progress
37:39 - Attitude-independence
41:19 - The relativist challenge, part 1
49:37 - The relativist challenge, part 2