Скачать или смотреть Ronald Dworkin: Rights-Based Constitutionalism

Another cornerstone of Dworkin’s theory is that individual rights take priority over collective goals. He argued that constitutional interpretation must protect pre-existing moral rights that individuals hold against the state, even if doing so is unpopular or politically inconvenient.

In Taking Rights Seriously (1977), Dworkin criticized utilitarianism and emphasized that a just legal system must be rights-based, not merely concerned with maximizing welfare or deferring to majoritarian decisions.

He believed:

Rights are trumps over political decisions.

Courts have a moral duty to protect those rights, even against legislative majorities.

The Constitution should be interpreted in a moral light, using the best understanding of justice and equality available.

Critiques and Legacy
Dworkin’s theories were not without criticism. Some saw his emphasis on moral reasoning as too subjective, potentially leading to judicial activism. Others challenged his rejection of originalism and legal positivism as impractical or overly idealistic.

Still, his work left a lasting imprint:

He reshaped constitutional discourse, making moral argument central to legal reasoning.

His ideas are frequently cited in U.S. Supreme Court opinions, legal scholarship, and human rights law.

He helped bridge the gap between legal theory and political philosophy, influencing thinkers in both fields.