Engine Fire Aboard Containership "President Eisenhower"

The following findings are from a preliminary report issued by PrimeServ Los Angeles, lightly edited for clarity. The official accident investigation is ongoing.

On April 28, 2021, at approximately 0130 hours (~8 hours after departure from Long Beach, California), the crew of the President Eisenhower got an alarm indicating fire in the engine room. Initially, it was believed to be the boiler that had caught fire, but after some time it was discovered to be the top of the main engine, cylinder unit 4-5-6, that was on fire.

The main engine was stopped from the bridge, the quick closing valves for the engine fuel supply were activated and engine room ventilation was shut down. Because the fire was developing and spreading quickly, it was decided to release the engine room CO2 fixed fire extinguishing system, which successfully extinguished the fire. The fire was ongoing for ~15 to 20 minutes.

The fuel return pipe for the fuel valves on cylinder unit #5 was found pulled out/disconnected from its T-coupling (cutting ring fitting). The open/disconnected fuel return pipe had been spraying gas oil onto the top of the cylinder cover and exhaust valve, and the gas oil ignited on the flange for the exhaust valve compensator/bellow.

Engine parts and components from top of the A-frame and upwards were damaged by the fire in the area for cylinder units #3, #4, #5, #6 and #7

According to saved CCTV recordings, it was observed that the fuel leak started on top of cylinder cover #5 and was spraying fuel oil (gas oil) onto the exhaust valve compensator area where the gas oil ignited on the hot exposed compensator flange. The leaking fuel return pipe was feeding the fire until the fuel supply to the main engine was cut off. According to information from the engine crew, the return pipe for the fuel valves on cylinder unit #5 had been replaced during the ship's port stay in Long Beach, immediately prior to the passage where the fire occurred.

The return pipe pulled out of the cutting ring fitting "likely due to incorrect assembly in way of insufficient tightening of the union nut or steel ferrule not mounted correctly, i.e. the pipe was not fully inserted through the steel ferrule at tightening."

"The reason for bursting of the steel protection hose on #5 fore fuel oil high pressure pipe and #6 centre fuel oil high pressure pipe have to be investigated further when dismantling of engine parts are possible and allowed by the USCG. It is unknown if the steel hose burst due to heat exposure or excessive pressure in drain passage between the high pressure pipe and the steel protection hose."

Extensive documentation from the accident investigation, including all of the written material shown in this video, is available in a shared Google Drive folder at rwp.yt/pef. The interview transcripts in particular paint a gripping picture of the events.