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The Dead Hand (known in Russia as Perimeter or Sistema "Perimetr") is a Cold War-era semi-automatic nuclear command-and-control system developed by the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s. It was designed to guarantee a massive nuclear retaliatory strike even if the country's political and military leadership was destroyed in a surprise "decapitation" attack. The system ensures mutually assured destruction (MAD) by removing the possibility that a first strike could prevent retaliation.
It is often misunderstood as a fully autonomous "doomsday machine," but reliable sources describe it as semi-automatic, requiring initial human activation and potentially human confirmation in deep bunkers before full launch.

Normal State (Dormant):
In peacetime, Perimeter is inactive or in a low-readiness mode, constantly monitoring but not armed for automatic action.
Activation in Crisis:
During heightened tensions or perceived threat, high-level Russian authorities (e.g., the President or General Staff) manually switch the system to active/combat mode. This is a deliberate human decision.
Monitoring for Attack:
Once active, Perimeter uses a network of sensors to detect signs of nuclear attack:
Seismic sensors (earthquakes from explosions)
Radiation detectors
Air pressure/overpressure sensors
Light/flash detectors
Early warning radars and satellites
It also checks for loss of communication with central command centers (e.g., Moscow or General Staff bunkers).

Decision Logic:
The system evaluates multiple conditions (described by developer Valery Yarynich as "if/then" propositions):
Is the system activated?
Are there signs of nuclear detonations on Russian soil?
Is communication with leadership severed?
Are there other indicators of attack?
If all criteria are met and no countermanding signal is received, it proceeds.

Human Element in Bunker:
In some accounts, authority transfers to duty officers in hardened underground bunkers (e.g., like Kosvinsky Mountain). These officers assess the situation and can approve or veto the launch. This makes it semi-automatic rather than fully autonomous.
Retaliatory Launch:
If confirmed:
Special command rockets (non-nuclear, based on modified ICBMs like the Sirena or older SS-17) are launched from protected silos.
These rockets fly over Russia, broadcasting encrypted launch codes via powerful radio transmitters (resistant to jamming).
The codes override normal controls and order surviving nuclear forces—silo-based ICBMs, submarine-launched missiles, and bombers—to fire at pre-programmed targets (primarily the U.S. and NATO).


This bypasses destroyed command chains, ensuring retaliation.
Current Status (as of 2025)
The system remains operational in Russia, with upgrades over the years:

Integration with modern early-warning radars (e.g., Voronezh).
Possible enhancements for hypersonic weapons and better electronic warfare resistance.
Russian officials (e.g., Strategic Missile Forces commanders in 2011 and later statements) have confirmed its existence and functionality. Analysts believe it is still a key part of Russia's nuclear deterrent posture.