Emergence, Explanation, and (Infinite) Idealization (Samuel Fletcher)

On Tuesday 4th May we were joined by Samuel Fletcher via Zoom.

Abstract

I argue that infinite idealizations in scientific modeling are not substantially different in function or form from other idealizations, once one understands "idealization" sufficiently broadly. This requires decoupling the traditionally ascribed motivations for idealization from its formal structure as applied to scientific models. Thus, contrary to some claims otherwise, there is no philosophically special or interesting distinction to be drawn between infinite and non-infinite idealizations. If an infinite idealization in scientific modeling seems to be special or different from the sorts of idealizations usually considered, it is not because the idealization employs the concept of infinity, but rather because it gives rise to emergent properties, often ones with explanatory import. I illustrate these theses with modeling examples from biology (population genetics) and physics (phase transitions).