Why Charge? Civil War strategy | Charges, tactics, and close action | Battle strategy and logistics

Why did officers order charges in the Civil War?
Why were Civil War battles fought so close?
Why didn't generals use more careful strategy?

There are many examples of disastrous charges in the civil war, ranging from regimental actions to entire divisions. Sometimes these daring charges work, most famously with Chamberlain's charge down Little Round Top on July 2 at Gettysburg. But oftentimes these charges are just disastrous, like the back-and-forth actions at the cornfield at Antietam.

However, there is a simple logistical reason why an army could not utilize a distance strategy. The reality is that infantry units had cartridge boxes with 40 or 60 rounds. A sustained fire would drain ammunition very quickly, even after just twenty minutes. Artillery, also, only have a few hours of firing before all the cannonballs would be expended. A distanced firing action would not result in a decisive action before ammunition was out.

Civil war generals actually used the land to completely hide portions of their forces. Units would be hidden within woods, behind ridges, or among cornfields, out of sight of the enemy, and could be thrown into action to surprise an approaching unit.

Many times, an attacker was completely blindsided by hidden forces at close range. Because this kind of attack is meant as a sudden shock, the action would by design be very close and devastating.

Civil war battles really were not like a game of chess, where each side saw the others' pieces. Movements were often meant to be hidden, and reserves were held out of sight of enemy lines. Oftentimes, an attacking force is essentially going in almost blind, not really sure how much enemy they are walking into. It was actually very nerve-wracking for generals to not see or hear anything happen for an extended period of time, because a stillness meant that an undetected body of enemy might be moving into position.

An extreme example of the use of topography to shield units occurred at Gettysburg. Longstreet moved thousands of men behind Seminary ridge, camouflaged behind the topography, out of sight of union eyes.

Another reason civil war battles were fought so close, resulting in disastrous charges, is a simple matter of logistics. As stated earlier, Civil war cartridge boxes might hold 40 or 60 rounds. If a soldier is firing three times a minute, his ammunition will quickly deplete. A ten-minute action might leave only 10 rounds remaining in a 40-round cartridge box, and the larger 60-round cartridge box will be half empty after ten minutes of heavy action. It's entirely possible for a unit that is engaged for fifteen or twenty minutes to be out of ammunition.

So, if a unit is out of ammunition, but they have an enemy on their front, the only recourse they have is to charge forward with bayonets. Chamberlain's movement down Little Round Top is a classic example of this.

Okay, so a unit is out of ammunition. Why not just fall back instead of committing to a potentially disastrous charge? Well, this is where the reality of logistics--running out of ammunition after fifteen or twenty minutes--intersects with the reality of military service.

Each officer is under orders. A regiment, brigade, or division has been given orders, which may say, "hold this position." General Grant's orders to certain divisions at Shiloh, for instance, including the verbiage "to hold this position at all hazards." This means the brigade or division is under direct orders to remain in position regardless of the cost. So, if a brigade has been engaged heavily for twenty minutes or longer, and no reserves or supply wagons are available, the officers are left with few options.

Finally, there may also be a psychological reason for a charge. A unit may have received terrible fire or be significantly outnumbered. A charge here, though desperate, is the result of a situation that is already desperate. Here, although seemingly counterintuitive, the tactic is psychological based, a shocking action that might throw the enemy off balance.

Rodes, after losing the sunken road at Antietam, threw 150 men against approaching union lines. While the charge was entirely desperate, a last-ditch effort to hold off a collapsing position, it did have the effect of convincing the blue lines to halt. The psychological impact succeeded: if the enemy is daring enough to charge, they may have more fight in them than initially thought, or there might be undetected reserves coming up behind them.

Another factor that required both sides to get so close was smoke. If a regiment of 300 men are firing constantly for several minutes, a smokescreen will impede their line of sight, and the unit will need to advance through the smoke to ensure that they are still facing in the right direction and to ensure that a friendly unit has not advanced in their firing zone. Smoke is a big reason why combatants would end up so close.

A film by Jeffrey Meyer, university librarian and historian