Скачать или смотреть Automatic Inference of Search Patterns for Taint-Style Vulnerabilities

Automatic Inference of Search Patterns for Taint-Style Vulnerabilities

Fabian Yamaguchi
Presented at the
2015 IEEE Symposium on Security & Privacy
May 18--20, 2015
San Jose, CA
http://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2015/

ABSTRACT
Taint-style vulnerabilities are a persistent problem in software development, as the recently discovered "Heart bleed" vulnerability strikingly illustrates. In this class of vulnerabilities, attacker-controlled data is passed unsanitized from an input source to a sensitive sink. While simple instances of this vulnerability class can be detected automatically, more subtle defects involving data flow across several functions or project-specific APIs are mainly discovered by manual auditing. Different techniques have been proposed to accelerate this process by searching for typical patterns of vulnerable code. However, all of these approaches require a security expert to manually model and specify appropriate patterns in practice. In this paper, we propose a method for automatically inferring search patterns for taint-style vulnerabilities in C code. Given a security-sensitive sink, such as a memory function, our method automatically identifies corresponding source-sink systems and constructs patterns that model the data flow and sanitization in these systems. The inferred patterns are expressed as traversals in a code property graph and enable efficiently searching for unsanitized data flows -- across several functions as well as with project-specific APIs. We demonstrate the efficacy of this approach in different experiments with 5 open-source projects. The inferred search patterns reduce the amount of code to inspect for finding known vulnerabilities by 94.9% and also enable us to uncover 8 previously unknown vulnerabilities.