Скачать или смотреть Dummett, Frege, and the Epistemic Core of Meaning

Michael Dummett has many axes of thought—inferentialism, anti-realism, justification, meaning-as-use, semantic anti-reductionism, the theory of understanding, and the epistemic notion of assertability. But the line I follow in my own work is a deeper, often overlooked thread:
for Dummett, meaning is not a static property of sentences nor a pattern emerging from successful verification; meaning is an epistemic capacity possessed by speakers.

Truth-conditional semantics tells us the target of a judgment.
Inferential roles tell us the connections between thoughts.
Meaning-as-use describes the practices in which language is embedded.

But underneath all these axes lies a core claim:

Meaning is something a speaker knows how to do. It is a capacity for navigating reasons, making distinctions, identifying correctness, and revising commitments—not merely a record of the circumstances in which an utterance comes out true.

My work on Dummett:

Vollet, L. R. (2025). Reconciling Logical Pluralism and Meaning-Theoretical Stability: Revisiting Logical Exceptionality by Rereading Dummett's Theory of Meaning and Inference. Revista Perspective Filosófica.

Vollet, L. R. (2022). Remarks on the problem of Sense in a pragmatic reading: an interpretation of Dummett on the intensional problem. Revista de Filosofia Aurora, 34(63), 173–191. https://doi.org/10.7213/1980-5934.34....

Vollet, L. R. (2024). Anchoring theories of meaning against truth-centered theories of meaning: A defense of Dummett against Davidson’s program. Pólemos – Journal of Philosophy Students at the University of Brasília, 13

Vollet, L. R. (2024). Structure, ingredient-sense, and assertoric strategy: Listening to Michael Dummett to interpret the legacy of Frege’s philosophy. Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia, 25(1), e66007. https://doi.org/10.23925/2316-5278.20...