This is an animation that visually depicts the Battle of Midway. It begins with a short summary of the events that led up to the Battle and then shows the movements and actions of the different ships, people, and aircraft involved.
When one compares the convoluted nature of Yamamoto's plan to Nimitz's, the latter emerges as simple and economical. Aware of the nature of the Japanese operation that ranged from the Aleutians to Midway, and involved aircraft carriers in both areas, Nimitz concentrated his forces at the most critical location, poised to attack the enemy when long-range flying boats operating from Midway would locate him. The actual sighting of the Japanese on June 3, heading for Midway, vindicated Nimitz's trust in the intelligence information he possessed, information that had been vital to the formulation of his strategy. Yamamoto, by contrast, could only hazard a guess where his opponent was: the American placement of ships at French Frigate Shoals and other islets in the Hawaiian chain, in addition to a swift exit of carrier task forces (Task Force 16 under Rear Admiral Raymond A. Spruance and Task Force 17 under Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher) from Pearl Harbor, meant that (1) Japanese submarine-supported flying boat reconnaissance could not originate at French Frigate Shoals and (2) the submarines deployed to watch for American sorties arrived on station too late.
Knowing Japanese intentions and the forces involved, Nimitz maintained the emphasis on the central Pacific, and sent cursory forces, sans aircraft carriers, to the Aleutians. The Pacific Fleet's battleships, on the west coast of the United States, played no role in the drama, because Nimitz's primary goal was the same of his opponent: sink the enemy aircraft carriers. While the Japanese hoped to draw the U.S. carriers, that had operated out of range through most of early 1942, so too Nimitz desired to bring the Japanese carriers, that had operated in much the same fashion from Pearl Harbor through the Indian Ocean (and thus well beyond reach) to the same end: destruction. Nimitz's strategy was direct and to the point; the Japanese involved operations that were to divert American strength from the main battle. Nimitz's knowledge of the Japanese intentions and deployment of forces, however, meant that he had no need to employ diversions to keep the enemy guessing. Nimitz knew where the enemy was to be and employed what forces he had to be there to meet him; he had faith in his commanders: Fletcher, victor of Coral Sea, enjoyed his confidence, and Spruance had come highly recommended by Vice Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., his commander during the early eastern Pacific raids.
Indeed, one can argue that the battle would never have taken place at all had Japanese intentions been cloaked in mystery. Nimitz's active preparations for the Battle of Midway indeed provided a momentous reception for the enemy, and once he had issued his operations orders, he entrusted the fighting of the battle to subordinates. Knowing your enemy is coming is one thing, but meeting him on the battlefield and defeating him, is altogether another. In the actions of June 4-6, 1942, those subordinates, from flag officer to fighter pilot, more than justified his faith in them. They had written, Nimitz declared afterward, "a glorious page in our history."
ミッドウェー海戦をビジュアルに描いたアニメーションです。 それは、戦いに至るまでの出来事の短い概要から始まり、その後、関与したさまざまな船、人々、航空機の動きや行動を示します。
ヤマモトの計画の複雑な性質をニミッツの計画と比較すると、後者の方がシンプルで経済的であることがわかります。 ニミッツは、アリューシャン列島からミッドウェー海までの範囲に及び、両海域の空母を含む日本軍の作戦の性質を認識しており、最も重要な場所に兵力を集中させ、ミッドウェーから作戦中の長距離飛行艇が敵を発見したときに攻撃する態勢を整えた。 6月3日にミッドウェーに向かう日本軍を実際に目撃したことは、ニミッツが保有する諜報情報、つまり戦略策定に不可欠な情報に対する信頼を証明した。 対照的に山本は、敵がどこにいるのか推測することしかできなかった。アメリカ軍がフランスのフリゲート艦ショールズとハワイ諸島の他の島に艦艇を配置し、さらに空母機動部隊（レイモンド・A・スプルーアンス少将指揮下の第16任務部隊とフランク・ジャック・フレッチャー少将指揮下の第17任務部隊）が真珠湾から速やかに撤退したことは、（1）日本の潜水艦支援飛行艇の偵察がフランスのフリゲート艦ショールから開始できないことを意味した。 (2) アメリカの出撃を監視するために配備された潜水艦が基地に到着するのが遅すぎた。
Информация по комментариям в разработке