Скачать или смотреть Red Wings Airlines Flight 9268 ATC Recording | 29 December 2012 Moscow, Russia

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Accident Description: https://www.instagram.com/p/CmwZ-StvF...

𝗥𝗲𝗱 𝗪𝗶𝗻𝗴𝘀 𝗔𝗶𝗿𝗹𝗶𝗻𝗲𝘀 𝗙𝗹𝗶𝗴𝗵𝘁 𝟵𝟮𝟲𝟴 was a ferry flight of a Tupolev Tu-204 (Reg. RA-64047) from Pardubice to Moscow on 𝗗𝗲𝗰𝗲𝗺𝗯𝗲𝗿 𝟮𝟵, 𝟮𝟬𝟭𝟮.

The plane departed Pardubice at 11:10 local time. Flight 9268 approached from the north and was cleared for landing on Moscow's runway 19. The plane touched down on the left hand main gear first while the wind was gusting to about 11,5 m/sec. When the nose gear touched down, the right hand undercarriage strut had not yet compressed. Immediately the crew moved the throttle levers to "maximum reverse". The thrust reversers did not deploy. Also, the air brakes and spoilers did not deploy automatically. After selecting maximum reverse, thrust was increased to 90% which caused the speed to increase from 110 knots to 130 knots.

Five seconds after switching off the "maximum reverse", the flight engineer requested the reversers be activated again. Maximum reverse was selected again with the engines spooling up to 84% thrust. The reversers still failed to deploy. 32 seconds after touchdown the plane had reached the end of the runway. It crossed the runway threshold at a speed of 116 knots. The flight engineer shut down the engines at the request of the captain. The plane then collided with the M3 highway embankment at a speed of 103 knots. It broke in three and the forward part of the fuselage came to rest on the highway.

𝗣𝗿𝗼𝗯𝗮𝗯𝗹𝗲 𝗖𝗮𝘂𝘀𝗲:
The accident was caused by misadjustment of reverse thrust control units of both engines and incorrect (inconsistent with the airplane's flight manual) control of ground spoilers and thrust reverse by the crew during the landing roll, which prevented proper braking action, causing runway excursion and collision with obstacles at high speed (ca. 190 km/h), destruction of the airplane and death of the crew members.

𝗖𝗼𝗻𝘁𝗿𝗶𝗯𝘂𝘁𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗙𝗮𝗰𝘁𝗼𝗿𝘀:
1) Stiffness of the reverse thrust control and locking mechanism that can manifest itself only during improper reverse thrust control by the crew and that is not mentioned in the maintenance manual section covering adjustments after engine change.
2) Contradictions between the aircraft and engine maintenance manuals and a continuous neglectful attitude to engine control system checks and adjustments (including the reverser control and locking mechanism) by organizations responsible for engine replacement, making it impossible for aircraft and engine developers to receive feedback and correct flaws.
3) Unstabilized approach with significantly exceeded (up to 45 km/h) speed on finals ultimately resulting in a prolonged flare and touchdown 950 m past the designated point.
4) Failure of spoilers and speedbrakes automatic deployment due to absence of the simultaneous both main gear Weight-On-Wheels signal caused by initial 'soft' left wheel touchdown (1.12g) in extreme conditions of 11.5 m/s right crosswind.
5) Failure of flight crew to verify the automatic spoilers and speedbrakes deployment after touchdown and to deploy them manually.
6) Flight manual violation regarding the use of reverse thrust by the crew applying maximum reverse in a 'single input' without setting the lever into intermediate position and failing to verify deployment of the reversers, which in turn led to forward thrust increase due to aforementioned reverse thrust control and locking mechanism flaw.
7) Absence of the simultaneous Weight-On-Wheels signal for both main landing gear struts during the whole landing roll due to specific sensors design (no sensor failure occured; each strut load must exceed 5,5 t) and crew's failure to extend spoilers manually that prevented reversers to deploy.
8) Captain's unsatisfactory crew management during the whole flight eventually resulting in unstabilized approach and during the landing roll concentration on the reverse thrust engaging leaving other systems unattended.
9) Failure to timely implement preventive measures after the 20.12.2012 Tu-204 RA-64049 Red Wings serious incident at Tolmachevo airport.
10) Unsatisfactory management level and insufficient safety procedures inside the Red Wings airline, as well as the assigned pilot-instructor's neglectful attitude to the captain's proficiency check and absence of the proper proficiency check inspection, which in turn made it impossible to determine and eliminate systematic captain s piloting deficiencies regarding exceeding approach speed on final, as well as the reverse thrust lever inputs technique after touchdown. Assessment monitoring described in Federal Aviation Rules-128 5.7 had not been performed.
11) Absence of the periodical training program concerning standard procedures in case of Weight-On-Wheels sensor failures resulting in failure of spoilers and speedbrakes to deploy. Existing simulators are not capable of modeling this kind of situation.